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CHARLES EVANS HUGHES. By Merlo J. Pusey. New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1951. 2 volumes, pp. xvi, 829. $15.00.
IT is not necessary to be a lawyer in order to be impressed by the life and
work of Charles Evans Hughes. So shining an example of great personal
integrity and devotion to principle in high office renews one's faith in the
efficacy of democratic leadership. A forthright editor of the New York
Evening Post once described Hughes as "the most straightforward, intellectu-
ally honest, transparently sincere person I ever have known." Much later
in his career another seasoned newspaperman spoke of his "moral unapproach-
ableness."
And yet ours is an age in which so much "cynical acid" has percolated into
the intellectual stream, that many may find this facet of the Hughes character
more than they can fully accept, and the man himself not quite as inspiring
or interesting as does his admiring biographer. Their credulity may be
particularly strained by the account of his nomination for President in 1916
not to mention his "reasons" for deciding to take it. In 1912, when it looked
as if only his nomination would keep the rift between Roosevelt and Taft
from splitting the Republican party, Hughes was reported to have made this
comment: "No man is as essential to his country's well being as is the unstained
integrity of the courts." Perhaps even more difficult to understand-but let it
be added that the biographer does explain it-is Hughes' failure to detect the
depredations of the "Ohio Gang" when he was a member of Harding's Cabinet.
He did not suspect the Secretary of the Interior, who was later to be sent to
prison for his part in the Teapot Dome scandals, of "anything worse than
vanity and mental indigestion."
Nevertheless, after reading Mr. Pusey's painstaking chronicle, it is plain
that for Hughes moral earnestness was a way of life, as it is also a clue to
his long and distinguished record of public service. It would almost seem as
if the religious intensity of his forebears found expression in his strongly
developed sense of civic duty. As John Bassett Moore wrote to him in 1928:
"You may be reckoned as somewhat of a specialist in subordinating your
private interests to public service."
But one must be careful not to exaggerate the ethical impulse in Hughes'
nature; he was no excited political evangelist. His appeal was always to
human reason and intelligence. "The cure for the ills of democracy is not
more democracy, but more intelligence" is the way he modified a favorite
shibboleth of the Progressive ferment. judging by the extent to which the
men in his party who did make the Presidency-Roosevelt, Taft, Harding,
Coolidge, Hoover-leaned on his counsel and his help, it may be assumed
that Hughes exerted a powerful influence on the practical politics of the
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country. Franklin D. Roosevelt, possibly the most astute and successful poli-
tician of our century, regarded him as the most formidable strategist in the
Republican Party.
From the time he was at Brown, Hughes revealed qualities of mind and
character which made those who saw him in action feel sure that he would
achieve great success and even renown. The self-discipline he mastered and
the superiority of his scholastic performance loom all the more remarkable
when it is recalled that he worked under the distractions of extreme financial
pressures. To his contemporaries he appears to have personified, in the vivid
language of Bertrand Russell, "all the noonday brightness of human genius."
They were witness, after all, to a towering intellect, a lively and sensitive
imagination, simply extraordinary powers of concentration and absorption,
and a persuasive tongue that was to ripen into a forensic skill and platform
oratory which more than one generation was to find quite "incomparable."
His striking presence, later made even more impressive through the cultiva-
tion of the famous whiskers, only served to strengthen the effect of immense
personal force. It is understandable then why Mrs. Hughes should have been
convinced, from the earliest days of their wonderfully happy marriage, that
her husband was "a man of destiny."
"I inherited a continuing ambition to excel in good work," Hughes once
confessed. At times this passion for excellence brought him to the verge of
physical collapse, which was averted only by a complete change in his activities,
as when he gave up his rapidly growing legal practice for the more sedate life
of the law teacher at Cornell. Similar considerations led him to resign as
Governor of New York (at the age of forty-eight) when Taft offered him the
"quiet" of the Supreme Court. But always he would drive himself even harder
in the next assignment.
Indeed, this combination of prodigious workmanship and moral idealism
gave a distinctive stamp to everything Hughes touched. These traits are
discernible in his fearless conduct of the life-insurance and public utility in-
vestigations which first brought him national attention; his record as a crusad-
ing Governor; his six years as Associate Justice; his stewardship as Secretary
of State; and his nearly twelve "great years"-the characterization is Brandeis'
-as Chief Justice of the United States. He contributed both his eloquence
and his amazingly constructive energies to the practical vindication of pro-
gressive aspirations. Such are the mysterious sources of public reputations,
that it is likely to come as a surprise to many to read that when Hughes was
Governor, he was far more advanced or "liberal" in his governmental theories
than either Wilson or Brandeis. Mr. Pusey writes:
"On several visits to New York, Wilson had spoken disparagingly of
Hughes' reforms. The courts, he insisted, could do more purifying
than "the new instrumentalities [Hughes' regulatory commissions] now
being unthinkingly elaborated." His scorn for regulatory commissions
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was as well defined as his contempt for Bryanism and for Theodore
Roosevelt's assault on big business.'
And again:
"Progressive Llr. Brandeis was still trying to cope with the big public
service corporations through specialized commissions and direct action
of the legislature. Hughes thought the time for such halfway measures
had passed.... Only strong and e-x-pert administrative agencies armed
with a mandate from the people could end the era of governmental
shadow boxing with gigantic utilities."2
And speaking of Hughes' services to enlightened democracy, it is impossible
to refrain from quoting his ever-timely condemnation of those "who would
corrupt public opinion." Appropriately enough, the first time he held forth on
this theme was in 1906, when his Democratic opponent for the governorship was
William Randolph Hearst. "The man who would corrupt public opinion,"
Hughes declared in the course of the campaign, "is the most dangerous enemy
of the state," adding:
"We have in this country but one security. You may think that the
Constitution is your security-it is nothing but a bit of paper. You
may think the statutes are your security-they are nothing but words
in a book. You may think that elaborate mechanism of government
is your security-it is nothing at all, unless you have sound and un-
corrupted public opinion to give life to your Constitution, to give vitality
to your statutes, to make efficient your governmental machinery."3
We are indebted to Mr. Pusey for publishing the full text of the one Hughes
utterance as Governor which posterity has done its best to distort. I refer,
of course, to his assertion that "We are under a Constitution, but the Consti-
tution is what the judges say it is.... ." Mr. Hughes seems to have despaired
of ever seeing his original meaning restored. But what must have rankled
most of all was the irony that the half-sentence whiich had been tom out of
context should have proved to be so useful to those supporting the "court-
packing" plan of 1937. Here is what the future Chief Justice actually said
in 1907:
"I have the highest regard for the courts. My whole life has been
spent in work conditioned upon respect for the courts. I reckon him
one of the worst enemies of the community who will talk lightly of
the dignity of the bench. We are under a Constitution, but the Consti-
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of our liberty and of our property utnder the Constitution." (Italics
supplied) .4
Mr. Pusey is probably justified in concluding, "In six years on the
Supreme Bench Hughes had attained a judicial stature not often equaled in
a similar period." Certainly his seminal opinions in the Mklimnesota 5 and the
Shreveport Rate0 cases have given him a permanent importance in the judicial
exposition of the most perplexing problem of our federalism, the reconciliation
of federal and state powers. His leadership in this field was not fortuitous;
Chief Justice White deliberately selected Hughes as the one member of the
Court equipped with both the intellectual capacity and the necessary practical
experience to guide it in formulating workable constitutional doctrines,
"Hughes had thoughtfully weighed every national and state claim to power
over transportation and come out with a statesmanlike apportionment that
would have done credit to John Marshall himself."
Now that some of the illusions about Holmes have given way to closer
scrutiny of his basic attitudes, few will quarrel with the contrast Mr. Pusey
draws between Holmes and Hughes as liberals. It is his judgment that as
Associate Justice, Hughes' record of liberalism is more substantial than that of
Holmes, who, incidentally, had both respect and affection for his much younger
colleague. When Hughes resigned in 1916, Holmes wrote to Pollock: "I shall
miss him consumedly, for he is not only a good fellow, experienced and wise,
but funny, and with doubts that open vistas through the wall of a nonconform-
ist conscience." An outstanding instance of their divergence is Bailey v. Ala-
bama,7 in which Holmes dissented vigorously from Hughes' opinion holding
invalid Alabama's "peonage" statute. "There is no more important concern,"
Hughes had written, "than to safeguard the freedom of labor upon which alone
can enduring prosperity be based." As for Holmes' position, it may be enough
to recall what Max Lerner has said about it: "For those who still cling to a
lingering belief that Holmes was a humanitarian liberal in his impulses, the
'Alabama peonage' case should be required reading."
Still, we can be sure that Hughes himself would have taken strong excep-
tion to the use of any such elusive labels in the discussion of judicial business.
Asked by a student in 1932 whether he considered himself conservative or
liberal, the Chief Justice said:
"These labels do not interest me. I know of no accepted criterion. Some
think opinions are conservative which others would regard as essentially
liberal, and some opinions classed as liberal might be regarded from
another point of view as decidedly illiberal. Such characterizations are
4. P. 204.
5. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1912).
6. Houston, E. & W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
7. 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911).
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not infrequently used to foster prejudices and they serve as a very poor
substitute for intelligent criticism. A judge who does his work in an
objective spirit, as a judge should, will address himself conscientiously
to each case, and will not trouble himself about labels." s
Imbued with such aview of judicial objectivity, Hughes naturally resented the
reckless imputations in the Senate debate on his appointment as Chief Justice.
While the fight cannot be compared with the furious and protracted battle over
Wilson's nomination of Brandeis, the fact is that more senators voted against
confirming Hughes than had voted against Brandeis. Their principal objection
seems to have been that Hughes, since leaving the Court, had amassed a fortune
representing wealthy individuals and powerful business interests. "No man in
public life so exemplifies the influence of powerful combinations in the political
and financial world," exclaimed Senator Norris, ending his attack with a
peroration strikingly reminiscent of the words he had flung at Stone five years
earlier: "[I ] t is reasonable to expect that these influences have become part of
the man. His viewpoint is clouded. He looks through glasses contaminated
by the influence of monopoly as it seeks to get favors by means which are denied
to the common, ordinary citizen." Forgotten were all the evidences of the
man's deep attachment to social progress and humane government, his cour-
ageous championing as private citizen of numerous unpopular causes-including
his militant stand against the expulsion of the Socialist Assemblymen from the
New York legislature-and, most unfairly of all, his unsullied record of intel-
lectual honesty.
As if in anticipation of the storm that was to break when President Hoover
named him as Taft's successor, Hughes had this to say in his lectures on the
Supreme Court in 1927:
"The Supreme Court has the inevitable failings of any human institution,
but it has vindicated the confidence, which underlies the success of
democratic effort, that you can find in imperfect human beings, for
the essential administration of justice, a rectitude of purpose, a clarity
of vision and a capacity for independence, impartiality and balanced
judgment which will render impotent the solicitation of friends, the
appeals of erstwhile political associates, and the threats of enemies." 9
But it was left to Professor Chafee to put the whole incident in its proper
perspective:
".Mr. Hughes was primarily a lawyer, and as such he felt it his duty to
represent loyally the client for whom he happened to be working.... On
the bench his client is the people of the United States, and there has
8 P. 691.
9. HUGHEs, THE SUPRmm COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 45-6 (1928).
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never been any danger that he would be inclined to represent any
other." 0
Obviously, any one of the major phases of Hughes' long career would merit
a book in itself. Trying to appraise a work which encompasses all of them
presents a problem in selection and emphasis. More than one-fourth of it, for
instance, tells of the four years during which Mr. Hughes was in charge of our
foreign relations, and from these pages there emerges a portrait of a very
great Secretary of State indeed. This is the best part of the book. Mr. Pusey's
imaginative re-creation of the atmosphere, conflicts, and personalities at the
Washington conference is a real tour de force. The Secretary's astonishingly
effective leadership of the Conference, achieved partly by sheer diligence but
mostly through his genius for conciliation, seems to have made a deep impres-
sion on everyone. A strong "internationalist" and one of the original supporters
of 'the League of Nations, he was not discouraged when he was forced to
abandon, after only a month in office, the attempt to win Senate approval for
our entrance into the League. Instead he continued to strive, in a variety of
subtle ways, to foster America's participation in the world community. The
methods by which he nevertheless managed to maintain cordial relations with
Congress and the press, at a time when isolationist sentiment was probably
at its peak, make instructive reading. Let William R. Castle, one of Hughes'
closest associates and later Stimson's Under-Secretary, give us (from his
diary) the secret of his Chief's phenomenal success:
"As long as I live I shall consider association with Mr. Hughes one
of the great privileges of life. It is inspiring to come into contact with
his mind, the most perfect mental machine in the world; with his
courage, which always dares to do the right thing.... If he was only
mind he would be a leader, but not the great leader he is. I know no
more splendidly human person, no one with a bigger heart or quicker
sympathy.""
Qualitatively the Hughes biography is one of those uneven books which
defies general characterization. But about one feature there can be little dis-
pute: Mr. Pusey, who is Associate Editor of the Washington Post, has taken
great pains to assemble and present a mass of exceedingly interesting and
valuable material. He makes excellent use of letters, public documents, news-
paper accounts, and biographical notes the Chief Justice started writing after
his retirement. Much of the story is conveyed with a perception and excitement
which would do honor to even the most creative of biographers. Mr. Pusey
largely succeeds in portraying Hughes in relation' to the forces and events of
his time, thus distilling for us a half-century of political and judicial history.
He is at his best when writing about political controversies and matters of




statecraft. But among the most expertly handled discussions are the legal
chapters, especially those on Hughes' service as Associate Justice.
Disappointment is all the keener, therefore, when one turns to the chapters
on the Chief Justiceship. The book's most serious defect is its treatment
of the one phase of Hughes' public life by which posterity is likely to measure
his lasting significance. Until this part of the book is reached, it could be
described as sympathetic but not an uncritical biography. The same is not
true of the final chapters.
In terms of ultimate contribution, it would be fair to assess Hughes' Chief
Justiceship by examining the part he played in relation to three distinct sets of
problems: (1) civil liberties, especially freedom of expression and racial
equality; (2) the improvement in the administration of the federal courts; and
(3) the constitutional crisis which culminated in the Roosevelt Administration's
challenge to the judiciary. The first two are discussed by Mr. Pusey with
meticulous care and scholarly restraint.
His analysis of the so-called New Deal cases, however, suffers too much
from special pleading. Mr. Pusey's distaste for the court-reorganization pro-
posal is so great that it has distorted his view of historically important
events and issues. But it is not necessary to be an apologist for the late
President's shabby scheme in order to appreciate that the situation it was
designed to remedy was fraught with grave peril to the nation. The funda-
mental transformations in constitutional theory-although not always candid-
ly acknowledged as such by the Justices-suggest, moreover, that the
"wound" sustained by the Court was, in Hughes' own phrase of an earlier
day, at least in part "self-inflicted." And while the Chief Justice cannot be
assumed to have exerted the decisive influence on the Court's deliberations,
neither can he be absolved of all blame. The least that can be claimed
for Hughes is that he met in the highest degree the test he himself had
formulated as the ultimate source of a Chief Justice's authority: "[H]is actual
influence will depend upon the strength of his character and the demonstration
of his ability in the intimate relations of the judges."
It may seem like petty criticism to find fault with a two-volume biography
because of what it says about just a few cases, however important they may
be. Yet these cases have a vital bearing on Hughes' stature as Chief Justice
in an age of transition, and on the strategy he pursued in meeting the threat to
the Court's independence. In view of the extent to which Mr. Pusey makes
Hughes live in the shadow of Marshall, it is difficult to understand his reluc-
tance to contemplate the possibility that his brilliant hero may have out-
maneuvered the man in the White House. Surely Marbury v. Madison has
not diminished Marshall's eminence as the Great Chief Justice.
Mr. Pusey has undertaken to prove too much. He is too anxious to show
that the Court Reorganization Plan had absolutely no effect on the course of
judicial decisions. The inevitable result is a complete misreading of the
Joues and Laughlin case and the cases from which it deviated, namely,
19521
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Schechter and Carter.1 2 It will be remembered that the message calling for
the enlargement of the Court's membership was sent to Congress on February
5, 1937, and that the decision in the Janes and Laughlin case came down on
April 12. From Mr. Pusey's comments on these cases, one would never
know that the latest of them wrought a veritable "revolution" in the theory
of our federal system. Regarding the outcome in the Schechter case he writes:
"If the test case had involved a big interstate industry, NRA would still have
gone down, but only on grounds of unconstitutional delegation of power."
And later: "There was no suggestion, as some critics have assumed, that
Congress could not regulate wages, hours, and industrial relations in big
enterprises operating across state lines." Had these observations been made
right after the case was decided, the worst that could be said was that they
were bad prophecy. Coming from a biographer who is also familiar with the
Chief justices's opinion in the Carter case, decided a year later, they require
a different explanation.
As regards the Schechter decision, quite apart from Carter, let us not over-
look the Chief justice's statement, "The question of chief importance relates
to the provisions of the code as to the hours and wages of those employed in
defendants' slaughterhouse markets. . . Their hours and wages have no
direct relation to interstate commerce." Any attempt to infer from these
words that Hughes was merely castigating the Administration for intruding
into the management of a strictly local business, and not foreclosing federal
control over working conditions in industry generally, was completely negated
by what he did and said in the Carter case. Not even in the Thirties could it
have been seriously doubted that the soft coal industry was "big" and
"interstate." "If the strategic character of this industry in our economy and
the chaotic conditions which have prevailed in it do not justify legislation,
it is difficult to imagine what would"-tersely commented Justice Douglas in
his opinion sustaining the constitutionality of the Bituminous Coal Act of
1937.13
When the Court had before it the Guffey Coal Act of 1935, Chief Justice
Hughes concurred in Justice Sutherland's opinion, for the majority, holding
the labor provisions unconstitutional. Because he thought that Congress had
power to set prices for coal shipped interstate, he filed an opinion object-
ing to the Court's refusal to separate the labor sections from the price-fixing
features of the statute. In it is to be found this unequivocal language:
12. Schechter Brothers Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 .(1935); .Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 317 (1936) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones
and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 76 (1937).. Only these cases will be considered
here. But Mr. Pusey's approach to several others, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S,
1 (1936) and Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), also illustrate the
factual and logical inadequacies of his analysis. For my discussion of all of these
cases on a previous occasion, see KONEFSKY, CHIEF JUSTICE STONE AND THE SUPREME
COURT 98-135 (1945).
13. Sunshine Anthracite Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 395 (1940).
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"I agree .. that production-in this case mining-which precedes
commerce, is not itself commerce; and that the power to regulate
commerce among the several States is not a power to regulate industry
within the State.
"... If the people desire to give Congress power to regulate indus-
tries within the State, and the relations of employers and employees
in those industries, they are at liberty to declare their will in the appro-
priate manner, but it is not for the Court to amend the Constitution
by judicial decision." '14
Admitting that Justice Sutherland's opinion in the Cartcr case "spread on
the record so narrow a view of the commerce clause that the President's
'horse and buggy' tag seemed belatedly fitting," Mr. Pusey nevertheless fails
to recognize that the Chief justice must share responsibility for the result.
Nor is he sufficiently aware that until the decisions upholding the Wagner
Act, prevailing constitutional doctrine denied to Congress authority to regulate
activities and relationships even within industrial plants producing for inter-
state markets. The Chief justice stood personally committed to these prin-
ciples. With respect to other segments of the economy his attitude was
quite different; he was himself the author of a far-reaching opinion vindicating
Congress' power over employer-employee relations on the railroads.15 There
is no indication that the distinction ever troubled him.
But the biographer does not agree. Appraising the Chief Justice's opinion
in the Jones and Laughlin case, Mr. Pusey is vigorous in defending him
against the charge of inconsistency:
"The great about-face of the Chief justice is supposed to have come
in the Jones and Laughlin case. His opinion is superficially said to be
a reversal of what he had written in the NRA and Carter Coal cases.
Some shift in emphasis is undeniably apparent, but it may be traced
entirely to the vast differences between the situations with which the
court was dealing. In the NRA case the court found that the commerce
power did not reach into the Schechters' chicken coop, and Hughes
employed every legitimate argument to buttress that conclusion. In
the NLRB case it was clear that the Jones and Laughlin empire
could be reached through the commerce power, and he naturally empha-
sized that fact. This is the universal practice of judges. Once a de-
cision has been made, they properly support it with the strongest
arguments at their command."'1
Mr. Pusey is begging two crucial and related questions. First, did not
the Carter case also concern far-flung activities which "could be reached
14. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., -98 U.S. 238, 317-18 (1936).
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through the commerce power"? And secondly, what suddenly led the majority
of five-but particularly Chief Justice Hughes and Mr. Justice Roberts-
to arrive at the "decision" that Congress was free to control labor relations
within a manufacturing establishment, before finding "the strongest argu-
ments" in support of it. In all fairness to Mr. Pusey, however, it must be
pointed out that the whole tone of the Chief Justice's elaborate opinion
carried the implication that he was not saying anything new.
Hughes was profoundly convinced that what was at stake in the crisis
precipitated by the Court Plan was nothing less than the fate of the Supreme
Court's historic role as "guardian" of the Constitution. Is it really so icono-
clastic, then, to surmise that a military analogy may well have suggested the
best strategy for the occasion? The decision to retreat in the immediate skir-
mish in order to assure victory in the larger "struggle for judicial suprema-
cy'1 7 need not have come as the result of active intrigue or cajoling of col-
leagues. Men facing a common danger have been known to do what had to
be done without talking about it. Since the "retreat" was to the Constitution,
furthermore, the tactics could not have been too difficult to execute. Neither
the Chief Justice nor Mr. Justice Roberts-the two key participants in the
judicial "about-face"m-was so fixed in his basic constitutional philosophy that
the "switch" in their application of essentially flexible doctrines demanded
sacrifice of "soul." There was always the comfort of Justice Brandeis' rationale,
"The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reason-
ing."
Justice Roberts had already reversed himself on minimum wages for
women.' 8 The decision in the Parrish case was not announced until March
29, but the Justice whose vote was decisive had informed his colleagues in
December that he was prepared to overrule the Adkins and Tipaldo cases.
By making much of the fact that this had taken place two months before the
Court Reorganization Message was sent to Congress, Mr. Pusey only
reveals that he does not reckon with the impact of the overwhelming vote of
confidence received by President Roosevelt in November 1936. In a funda-
mental sense, Mr. Dooley's "wit of cynicism," as Justice Frankfurter has
characterized the notorious quip--"th' Supreme Coort follows th' illection
returns"-is not without historical justification. Hughes, in his book on the
Supreme Court, had observed that proper discharge of the Court's function
depends less on "formulas" and more "on a correct appreciation of social
conditions and a true appraisal of the actual effect of conduct." It is not beyond
the realm of possibility that the effect of the 1936 electoral landslide, followed
by the effort to "reform" the Court, was to sharpen his own "appreciation"
of the changed character of the American economic system and his own
"appraisal" of political realities.
17. This is the apt title which Robert H. Jackson gave to his remarkably objective
book on the same period, published in 1941.
18. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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However this may be, it would appear that the intellectual hazards inherent
in the writing of a lengthy book are not unlike those attending a long life;
the opportunities for self-contradiction, and even more serious lapses, tend
to multiply. It is regrettable that Mr. Pusey has spoiled an otherwise truly
superior biography by overdrawing the image of his subject. Blanket com-
parison with Marshall will not erase the fact that as Chief Justice, Hughes
failed, on several critically important occasions (before 1937, to be sure), to
perceive the real nature of the problems confronting his country and of the
constitutional powers to deal with them.
But the life and achievements of Charles Evans Hughes were distinguished
enough not to require artificial inflation. Even after allowing for his limita-
tions, the biographer could still have said of him what Holmes said of
Brandeis: "I think he has done great work and I believe with high motives."
SAMUEL J. KONEFSrYt
LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES-A STUDY OF THE AVAILABILITY OF
LAWYERS' SERVICES FOR PERSONS UNABLE TO PAY FEES. By Emery A.
Brownell. Rochester: Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company, 1951.
Pp. 333. $4.50.
THIS volume is the end result of a major effort of the Survey of the Legal
Profession. The author, Emery A. Brownell, has had a distinguished career
in legal aid work and is therefore exceptionally well qualified. Using as a
starting point Reginald Heber Smith's pioneer study, Justice and the Poor,
published in 1919 but reviewing the conditions as they existed in 1916. the
study traces the history and development of legal aid in this country since
that time, analyzes the existing services, the unmet needs both in civil and
criminal cases, and the steps necessary to meet these needs. It brings together
all available materials, and in addition the results of several studies made
expressly for this volume. The book is accompanied by 39 statistical tables
and 5 charts, a foreword by Harrison Tweed, President of the National Legal
Aid Association, and a lengthy and provocative introduction by Reginald
Heber Smith. It is without question the most comprehensive study of legal
aid service in this country ever published, and the first important study since
the great depression. It will be of great value in providing a basis for chart-
ing and promoting legal aid work in this country.
One of the chief contributions of the book is the completeness of its study
of legal aid in criminal cases. The principal facts are marshalled covering
assigned counsel, public defenders, private defenders and other methods of
providing counsel to accused. The evaluation of these several approaches is
t Assistant Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College.
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